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The world financial crisis that started in the US housing 
market in 2008 brought into evidence deep failures of 
prudential oversight, linked for the most part to a failure 
to comprehend and handle systemic risk in a way that 
could prevent systemic crises. This paper summarizes 
the responses to the joint World Bank-ASBA survey o 
the state of systemic oversight in the Latin American 
and Caribbean financial sectors and reflects on some of 
the challenges identified by respondents. The authors 
found that there is broad consensus among regional 
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financial authorities on the need to enhance the current 
systemic oversight framework. Improving consolidated 
supervision to mitigate risk-shifting in conglomerates, 
adjusting prudential regulations to account for the 
accumulation of systemic risks, redefining the role of 
the supervisor to make it more proactive, and improving 
coordination among local supervisors as well as with 
foreign supervisors figure preeminently in the regional 
reform agenda.Systemic Oversight Frameworks in LAC: 










The World Bank 
Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency  











JEL: G21, G28 
Keywords: systemic oversight frameworks, prudential oversight, financial regulation, financial supervision, macro-
prudential policies, Latin America 
   
                                                           
1  Eva  Gutierrez  is  a  Sr.  Financial  Sector  Specialist  in  the  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  Region  of  the  World  Bank 
(egutierrez2@worldbank.org). Patricia Caraballo is consultant at the World Bank (pcaraballo@worldbank.org). The authors want 
to thank first and foremost all survey respondents, as well as Alain Ize, Augusto de la Torre, Rudy Araujo, Rafael Diaz, Ilias 
Skamellos and Mariano Cortes for their comments and inputs on the survey design. Any remaining mistakes are our own. 2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The world financial crisis that started in the US housing market in 2008 brought into evidence 
deep failures of prudential oversight, linked for the most part to a failure to comprehend and 
handle systemic risk in a way that could prevent systemic crises. Systemic risk is defined as “a 
risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the 
financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real 
economy”
2. Systemically important  financial institutions  (SIFIs) are  those  impending failure, 
inability to operate or disorderly wind down could produce systemic effects as defined above. 
There are two dimensions to systemic risk; one relates to how risk is distributed in the financial 
system at a given point in time (“cross sectional dimension”) while the other relates to how risks 
evolve  over  time  (“temporal  dimension”)
3.  The  current  oversight  framework  focuses  on 
individual  institutions  (microprudential  framework)  as  opposed  to  the  s ystem  as  a  whole 
(macroprudential framework). 
 
A macroprudential approach to oversight has been proposed for some time with a view to 
manage systemic risk
4 and is now being developed by standard setters.  From a cross sectional 
dimension  (also  denominated  micro-systemic  risk  perspective),  regulation  focuses  on  (i) 
removing incentives for the accumulation of risks in certain types of intermediaries, including 
through the extension of regulatory perimeters and the homogenization of regulations across 
different intermediaries to avoid regulatory arbitrage, (ii) adjusting prudential requirements to 
take  into  account  the  systemic  risk  induce  by  the  institution,  (iii)  improving  safety  net 
mechanisms to reduce moral hazard pose by SIFIs that are deemed too -big-to fail
5. From a 
temporal  dimension,  regulatory  efforts  aim  at  mitigating  procyclicality  by  preventing  the 
building up of risks in the cycle upturn and creating buffers to cushion the downturn to avoid a 
credit crunch. On the supervisory front, efforts are directed to monitor interconnections between 
participants  and  common  risk  factors.   Such  approach  requires  close  coord ination  between 
                                                           
2 IMF, BIS, FSB (2009): Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial 
Considerations. Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors. 
3  Caruana,  J.  (2009):  “The  International  Policy  Response  to  the  Financial  Crises:  Making  the  Macroprudential  Approach 
Operational”, panel remarks at Jackson Hole. 
4  Crockett,  A.  (2000):  “Marrying  the  Micro  and  Macroprudential  Dimensions  of  Financial  Stability”,  speech  at  the  11
th 
International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Basel. 
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financial  sector  supervisors  and  other  financial  sector  authorities,  especially  monetary 
authorities.  
 
The Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC), with the notable exceptions of some Caribbean 
countries  affected  by  the  failure  of  a  complex  insurance  conglomerate,  weathered  the  latest 
global financial crisis in part reflecting lessons learnt during past financial crisis as well as a 
somewhat different approach to oversight. Moreover, the credit cycle was not as pronounced as 
in the industrialized countries most affected by the crisis and public and private sector balance 
sheets were stronger than in past crisis episodes. However, as the region’s financial systems 
become  more  complex  and  more  tightly  integrated  with  those  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  the 
question remains as to whether it could become exposed to similar failures caused by homebred 
endogenous dynamics or increased vulnerability to external turbulence.  
 
In  a  framework  of  collaboration  between  the  World  Bank  (WB)  and  the  Association  of 
Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA), the two institutions partnered to prepare a survey 
and identify the state of systemic oversight frameworks in the region. The survey also intends to 
understand the perception of the region on the possible need for a reform program aimed at better 
capturing and addressing systemic risk. This paper summarizes the responses to the survey and 
reflects on some of the challenges identified by respondents. The paper is organized as follows: 
section 2 provides a description of the survey; section 3 summarizes the main messages coming 
up from the survey; sections 4 to 9 provide a detailed description of the responses to the main 
sections of the survey; and section 10 provides some concluding thoughts. 
 
2.  Description of the Survey 
 
To understand the regional perception on the importance of systemic oversight, the status of 
practices in the region and challenges going forward, the survey included questions on three 
broad topics: microprudential oversight, management of economic cycles, and questions related 
to macroprudential oversight. The survey was sent to all the LAC bank supervisory agencies that 
are members of ASBA. The head of banking supervision of the agency (from now on called 
supervisor) was asked to respond, and to forward the survey to the financial stability or research 4 
 
department of the central bank (from now on referred as monetary authorities), even if not an 
ASBA member. Bank supervisors were asked to respond to questions related to microprudential 
and macroprudential oversight while monetary authorities were asked to respond to the questions 
related to management  of economic cycles  and macroprudential  oversight.  Bank supervisors 
could coordinate responses with other line supervisors (such as insurance, pensions or securities) 
but only one response would be send by country.  Of the 31 countries members of ASBA in the 
LAC region, 19 supervisors and 9 central banks responded the survey (Annex 1).  
 
The survey comprises 117 questions that seek to capture the basic framework and facts, as well 
as the authorities’ views and plans, regarding the six following questions: 
 
1.  How important is it to enhance the current systemic oversight framework? 
2.  Is there a need for redefining the perimeter of regulation in order to help preventing 
excessive risk-taking behavior and limit the scope for regulatory arbitrage? 
3.  How much progress has already been achieved towards measuring and internalizing the 
cross-sectional  component  of  systemic  risk  and  what  are  the  major  issues  looking 
forward? 
4.  How  much  progress  has  already  been  achieved  towards  addressing  the  dynamic 
component of systemic risk and what are the major issues looking forward? 
5.  How well equipped are supervisors to face the challenges of systemic supervision? 
6.  How effective is the inter-agency collaboration (between the central bank, the domestic 
supervisory agencies and the cross-border supervisory agencies) in assessing systemic 
risks and taking appropriate action when needed? 
 
3.  Main Survey Findings 
 
There is broad consensus among regional financial authorities on the need to enhance the current 
systemic oversight framework.  Latin American economies withstood reasonably well the recent 
financial crisis, but financial authorities in LAC see an increasing likelihood of occurrence of a 
systemic risk- induced financial crisis as systems develop and become more sophisticated. Most 
survey respondents indicated that enhancing supervisory capacity to assess systemic risks and to 5 
 
identify risks in sophisticated products is a top priority, followed by the need to adjust prudential 
norms to account for systemic risk. About half of respondents pointed out that systemic risk 
monitoring  needs  strengthening,  with  smaller  countries  being  less  comfortable  about  their 
monitoring  framework.  In  many  countries  for  example,  housing  prices  and  housing  market 
developments are not monitored due to lack of proper price indices and only half of respondents 
monitor systemic risk based on macro developments and credit growth on a regular basis. The 
biggest  stumbling  block  in  the  road  to  reform  is  boosting  supervisory  capacity  and  human 
capital. Issues related to the supervisory architecture appear relevant as well, with the majority of 
respondents indicating that rethinking the organization of supervision was an important factor to 
consider for the improvement of systemic oversight. 
 
Regulatory perimeters in LAC are widely set and resetting the perimeter does not appear as a top 
priority at this time. Nevertheless supervisors perceive important opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage for institutions outside the perimeter and indicate that they plan to extend the perimeter 
to hitherto unregulated institutions. Retail stores, microfinance institutions and to less extent 
factoring companies are the intermediaries most frequently outside the oversight perimeter. The 
silo approach to financial intermediation appears prevalent in LAC, with restrictions on activities 
to be undertaken by institutions with different licenses and regulation rarely based on the nature 
of the activity alone. Prudential regulations in LAC tend to be comprehensive, with the notable 
exception of regulations for cooperatives, although liquidity regulations are not as widely applied 
as capital adequacy and provisions. Peculiarities with cooperatives regulations may be related to 
the fact that in several countries their oversight resides in a ministerial department or is the 
responsibility  of  cooperatives  federations.  Albeit  regulatory  perimeters  are  wide,  safety  net 
perimeters are much narrower, mainly covering only commercial banks. 
 
The most pressing perimeter issues relate to risk-shifting among conglomerates, but powers to 
regulate conglomerates do not appear comprehensive. This is particularly the case for structures 
where financial (and real sector) companies that belong to the group are not owned by the bank 
but  by  entity  that  owns  the  bank.  In  several  countries,  banking  groups  (BG)  or  financial 
conglomerates (FC) exclude non-financial group entities. Few countries require constituting a 6 
 
financial holding company (FHC) to control FC financial sector activities and in the majority of 
cases can be created abroad. Capital requirements over holding companies are rare.  
 
Regulation of the cross-sectional components of systemic risk is, as elsewhere, incipient. While 
LAC  is  ahead  of  other  regions  in  the  use  of  countercyclical  provisions,  the  use  of  other 
countercyclical prudential regulations is limited.  Capital charges in LAC are uniform across 
banks, and do not vary with the size of the institution, interconnectedness or other factors that 
determine  its  contribution  to  systemic  risk.  The  existing  liquidity  requirements  that  are 
considered of systemic nature relate to central bank reserve requirements and regulations that 
require  banks  to  have  contingency  planning  in  the  event  of  systemic  liquidity  shocks6.  
Countercyclical capital, liquidity and lending requirements or circuit breakers7  have not been 
adopted, but in the region, financial authorities seem to be more open to consider countercyclical 
provisions and capital requirements. Implementation difficulties seem to be hampering wider 
adoption of such norms. 
 
The majority of respondents thought that there should be a fundamental redefinition of the role 
and functions of the supervisor and making it more proactive.  However, supervisory powers to 
request additional buffers to account for the buildup of systemic risks appear limited in several 
jurisdictions. Agencies’ legal mandates, political and industry pressures and lack of adequate 
legal protection for supervisors were quoted as factors hampering the exercise of supervisory 
discretion.  
 
The stability of the financial system is a collaborative effort between various regulatory bodies 
albeit there appears to be scope for improving coordination between supervisors and the central 
bank,  and  among  different  supervisors.  The  majority  of  supervisors  do  not  participate  on 
monetary policy meetings, although most consider it would be convenient since the banking 
sector is an important channel for monetary policy transmission and such decisions may impact 
                                                           
6 Nevertheless, some highly dollarized countries have introduced prudential liquidity requirements to deal with 
dollarization risks which are systemic in nature.   
7 A circuit breaker is defined as a temporary change in operational or market procedures under periods of high 
turbulence, including suspension of deposit convertibility or mutual fund redemptions, stock trading suspension, 
short-selling bans, mark-to-market adjustments, etc. A circuit breaker is considered pre -wired if it is already 
embedded in the contract and legal framework. 7 
 
financial  sector  stability.  Formal  and  regular  meetings  between  the  head  of  monetary  and 
supervisory  agencies  to  discuss  macro-prudential  issues  take  place  in  only  half  of  countries 
meetings  among  technical  staff  are  rarer.  Collaboration  of  supervisors  in  the  production  of 
central bank financial stability reports is limited, and collaboration of staff from central bank 
financial stability units in supervisory activities (including off-site supervision or stress testing 
exercises) does not take place. Only half of the respondents indicated that that there are formal 
arrangements  in  place  to  discuss  and  resolve  potential  issues  of  regulatory  arbitrage  across 
financial institutions with different licenses supervised.   
 
Lastly, there are important challenges on cross border coordination to deal with systemic risk in 
the LAC region. The main sources of concern regarding systemic oversight are international 
financial groups and regional financial groups. Lack of effective arrangements for cross-border 
information exchange and discussion of common issues to deal with cross-border crisis, and for 
sharing the resolution costs of institutions operating cross-border are sources of concern among 
regional supervisors. 
 
4.  Relevance of Systemic Oversight Reform 
 
Financial authorities in LAC see that the likelihood of occurrence of a systemic risk- induced 
financial  crisis  increases  as  systems  develop  and  become  more  sophisticated.  Most  Latin 
American supervisors and monetary authorities think unlikely that a financial crisis similar to the 
one recently experienced in the US could happen in their countries under the current stage of 
financial development. However, as the system evolves in sophistication, over 50 percent of the 
respondents  consider  somewhat  likely  that  a  US-type  crisis  could  happen  in  their  countries 
(Figure 1). Over 80 percent of respondents pointed to limited exposure to subprime assets and 
toxic US assets as important or extremely important reasons for their financial system resilience. 
More than half also thought that a simpler financial system with limited global integration and a 
stricter approach to prudential oversight had helped.  
 
Most  respondents  felt  the  latest  world  cycle  did  not  complicate  much  local  prudential 
management (Figure 1). However, there seems to be some difference in perceptions; a third of 8 
 
monetary authorities indicated that it had complicated prudential  management on the upturn 
while only 20 percent of supervisors thought so. Aggregate demand fluctuations were the most 
important source of financial sector vulnerability to the last economic cycle, ahead of exchange 
rate fluctuations or volatility in capital flows. Several respondents indicated that US aggregate 
demand fluctuations had an impact on GDP, employment levels, exports and remittances. The 
main reported direct effect on the financial sector of the global downward spiral that began in 
September  2008  was  liquidity  shortages,  but  respondents  indicated  that  policies  to  provide 
foreign and domestic liquidity succeeded in overcoming the situation.  
 
About  half of respondents  indicated that systemic risk monitoring needs  strengthening, with 
smaller countries being less comfortable about their monitoring framework (Figure 1). The LAC 
5 countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) generally perceived that their approach 
to overseeing systemic risks is good although they noted it is necessary to further strengthen 
coordination  among  different  financial  authorities.  Enhancing  supervisory  capacity  to  assess 
systemic risks and to identify risks in sophisticated products is the top priority (more than 80 
percent of respondents thought them to be very important or extremely important) followed by 
the  need  to  adjust  prudential  norms  to  account  for  cross-sectional  systemic  risk  (about  70 
percent). Making prudential norms more counter-cyclical and enhancing supervisory powers to 
take discretionary action to reduce systemic risks was considered extremely or very important by 
over 60 percent of respondents. Also, 80 percent (or more)of respondents thought that improving 
the safety net, improving the accounting framework and enhancing transparency, and resetting 
the regulatory perimeter of prudential oversight was at least important. One country indicated 
that extending the regulatory perimeter to conglomerate holdings would also be very important. 
Virtually all supervisors and monetary authorities indicated that cooperation with each other is 
very or extremely important to improve systemic oversight. Cooperation with other domestic 
supervisors and foreign supervisors is also considered very important. 
 
The biggest stumbling block in the road to reform is boosting supervisory capacity and human 
capital. Close to 80 percent of the respondents saw this as very or extremely important challenge, 
particularly because inadequate regulatory capacity cannot keep up with fast-evolving markets  
 9 
 
Figure 1. Relevance of Systemic Oversight Reform 
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and products (Figure 1). Several respondents indicated that multilateral institutions could play a 
useful role to enable continuous capacity building and guidance on international best practices.  
Mobilizing support for the necessary legal and institutional reforms, getting a clearer vision of 
the issues and alternatives and boosting cross-agency coordination are also viewed as pressing 
issues. 
 
5.  Regulatory Perimeters in LAC and Scope for Regulatory Arbitrage 
 
Despite the relative simplicity of financial systems in LAC, a variety of financial intermediaries 
operate in most countries
8. Commercial banks, credit cooperatives and insurance companies are 
present in virtually all countries. In at least half of the countries microfinance institutions, credit 
card companies, finance companies, leasing companies operate as well (Figure 2)
9. Hedge funds, 
retail stores and public utility firms conduct financial intermediation in only few countries, while 
offshore banks and factoring companies operate in about 40 percent of countries. Three countries 
clarified that off-shore banks could not conduct business with residents. In addition, investment 
vehicles —which invest resources from the public but they are not leveraged—operate in most 
countries as well including pension funds,  money market funds, mutual funds, and other funds. 
Prudential oversight perimeters tend to be wide in LAC.  Retail stores, microfinance institutions 
and  to  less  extent  factoring  companies  are  the  intermediaries  most  frequently  outside  the 
oversight perimeter (Figure 2). Supervisory perimeters tend to broadly coincide with regulatory 
perimeters  albeit  there  are  notable  exceptions  (for  example  insurance  companies  are  not 
supervised in Haiti). Most institutions are supervised by the central bank or a superintendence. 
Brokerage houses are the intermediaries more frequently supervised by an independent securities 
commission  or superintendence. However, in  several countries  regulation and supervision of 
cooperatives  resides  in  a  ministerial  department  or  is  the  responsibility  of  cooperatives 
federations (which in some cases are then in turn supervised by the financial supervisor)
10. Most 
supervisors indicated that are considering extending the perimeter of regulation in the near term 
                                                           
8 Financial intermediaries are defined as those that borrow resources from the public to lend or invest in a leverage way. 
9 However, based on comments to the survey it is unclear to what extent microfinance institutions actually borrow resources from 
the public. 
10 Cooperatives operate in 18 countries but are regulated in 17 countries and supervised in 16 countries. In 7 countries regulation 
and/or supervision is outside the central bank or superintendence. 11 
 
for  those  intermediaries  that  are  yet  un-supervised/un-regulated
11.  Institutions  are  mostly 
regulated independently of their size. However, in 3 countries, cooperatives are only reg ulated 
and supervised beyond a certain threshold related either to size or to whether they take deposits 
from the public in addition to member deposits. Investment vehicles tend to be regulated as well, 
with very few exceptions in small countries with underdeveloped capital markets. 
Prudential  regulations  in  LAC  tend  to  be  comprehensive,  with  the  notable  exception  of 
regulations  for  cooperatives,  although  liquidity  regulations  are  not  as  prevalent  as  capital 
adequacy  and  provisions  (Figure  2).   This  is  s omewhat  surprising  since  while  insolvent 
institutions may continue operations if they are liquid, illiquidity may precipitate the failure of a 
solvent institution.  Absence of liquidity regulations is particularly widespread for brokerage 
houses
12. The type or regulation applied to cooperatives in many countries seems rather weak. 
Only 15 of the 17 countries that indicate regulate cooperatives provided details on the type of 
regulation applied. Provisions seem to be the most common regulation (applied in 14  countries), 
followed by exposure limits and licensing (12 countries). In 4 out of the 15 respondent countries 
there are no minimum paid in capital requirements or capital adequacy ratios, and in two third of 
those countries there are no liquidity regulatio ns for cooperatives. Insurance companies are 
regulated in 16 cases, but regulations only imply licensing and minimum paid in capital in 14 
cases, capital adequacy ratio in 11 cases and provisions in 12. In 2 countries out of the 7 in which 
off-shore banks operate, they are not subject to CAR or provisions regulations, and in one case, 
off-shore banks are not subject to minimum paid in capital.  In the case of investment funds, 
about 50 percent of respondents indicated they had liquidity requirements for mutu al funds, 
mostly in the form of liquidity requirements for money market funds, although in some cases 





                                                           
11 One supervisor indicated that they are not considering to extend the regulatory perimeter as unregulated sector was small, with 
loans of unregulated institutions currently amounting to about 1.5 percent of bank loans. 






















































































































































































































































































Please mark the institutions which are prudentially regulated and 
supervised and under which agency
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Figure 2. Perimeter of Oversight 
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Please mark those institutions that have direct access to official liability 
guarantees (e.g. deposit insurance) and lender of last resort facilities
Official Liability Guarantees Lender of Last Resort13 
 
Albeit regulatory perimeters are wide, safety net perimeters are much narrower, mainly covering 
only  commercial  banks  (Figure  2).  Nevertheless  in  some  countries,  mostly  Caribbean  and 
Central American, there are neither deposit insurance arrangements nor central bank facilities for 
commercial  banks  (the  latter  reflecting  restrictions  due  to  official  dollarization).  Credit 
cooperatives are typically outside the safety net. Access to lender of last resort facilities is quite 
limited.  
The silo approach to financial intermediation appears prevalent in LAC. In most countries it is 
necessary to obtain a license to conduct financial intermediation, which is typically granted by 
the  agency  responsible  for  prudential  oversight  of  the  intermediary.  Only  60  percent  of 
respondents  grant  a universal  banking license,  albeit  universal  banks  cannot  conduct  a wide 
range of activities (Figure 2).  Universal banking licenses in LAC typically allow to conduct 
leasing and factoring, and to less extent investment fund management, merchant and investment 
banking (Figure 3). However, in most cases insurance and securities brokerage cannot be done 
by universal banks.  
Prudential norms are rarely set on the basis of activity alone and typically regulations do not 
consider contingent liabilities. Typically either is done on the basis of the license (40 percent of 
cases), or it takes into account both license and activity. However, all respondents (but one) 
indicated that minimum paid in capital varies with the nature of the license in all countries. 
Several countries indicate that the activity is restricted to the type of license granted; however, 
many  intermediaries  can  grant  loans  or  invest.  In  the  case  of  Chile,  for  example,  insurance 
companies can grant retail loans —a common practice in several countries by which insurance 
companies  lend  using  the  insurance  policy  as  collateral—but  are  supervised  by  the 
superintendence  of  Securities  and  Insurance  instead  of  the  Banking  Superintendence,  which 
supervises  other  lending  institutions.  Only  in  the  case  of  commercial  banks  does  prudential 
regulation take into account the size of contingent liabilities. For most other intermediaries it is 
unusual. Also, respondents indicated that no domestic bank can set an off-shore bank and operate 
with residents under different prudential regulations.   
Powers to  regulate conglomerates do not  appear  comprehensive.  In 40 percent  of countries, 
banking groups (BG) or financial conglomerates (FC) exclude non-financial group entities. Most 14 
 
supervisors  indicated  they  can  presume  which  companies  belong  to  the  FC  (80  percent). 
However, only in 30 percent of respondent countries a financial holding company (FHC) has to 
be created to control all of their financial sector activities. Moreover, FHC can in the majority of 
cases be created abroad and in those cases it would be under foreign supervision. Related party 
limits are a widespread tool to reduce exposure from the bank to the rest of the FC or economic 
group. Permissible activities and larger exposure limits are also applied in about 2/3 of the cases 
while ownership limits in about half of cases (Figure 3). In more than half of the countries there 
is no special capital requirement for financial groups. Some countries seem to have interpreted 
this as powers over the holding company (in cases where the holding has to be constituted) and 
others seem to interpret the group as the bank and their subsidiaries. Powers over conglomerates 
do not appear to be more extensive in LAC 5 countries where 4 out of 5 countries don’t have 
capital requirements over the group in comments to the questions. However, for example in the 
case of Mexico there is an agreement of responsibility by the holding with regards to the losses 
of its subsidiaries
13. About 70 percent of countries consider the financi al group (understood in 
most cases as a bank and its subsidiaries) when setting capital requirements; they set them either 
on  a  fully  consolidated  basis,  or  set  requirements  for  both  the  group  and  the  individual 
institutions. 
Supervisors  and  monetary  autho rities  perceive  substantial  scope  for  regulatory  arbitrage, 
particularly across regulated and unregulated institutions as well as across borders. More than 50 
percent  of  respondents  thought  such  issues  to  be  very  or  extremely  important,  even  though 
regulatory perimeters are wide as previously discussed (Figure 3).  Arbitrage among institutions 
belonging to the same group and financial intermediaries with different licenses was perceived 
also as important by about 50 percent of respondents. Accordingly, the most pressing perimeter 
issues  relate  to  risk-shifting  among  conglomerates,  both  cross  border  and  domestic.    Other 
perimeter issues associated with accumulation of opaque liabilities including through derivatives 
by real sector corporations, over the counter trading of derivatives activities and provision of  
 
                                                           
13 The financial group's holding company is responsible for all and every liability and/or losses (defined as an inability to meet its 
obligations due to lack of assets) of its subsidiaries. In the event of simultaneous defaults, the group should respond for its bank's 
liabilities  first,  and only  the deal  with  the  issues concerning  the  rest  of  its subsidiaries on  a  pro-rata basis. For their part, 
subsidiaries charter's are required to explicitly state that they will not be held responsible for losses of their holding company or 
those of fellow subsidiaries within the group. 15 
 
Figure 3. Scope for Regulatory Arbitrage and Perimeter Issues 
   
   


















Ownership limits Permissible 
activities
Related party limits Large exposure 
limits
Please mark the main regulatory firewalls between the bank and the rest of 
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services by unlicensed intermediaries were also perceived as important by at least 50 percent of 
respondents. 
Credit cooperatives and insurance companies are institutions for which respondents think that is 
most important to strengthen regulation for systemic concerns (Figure 3). About 50 percent of 
respondents also indicated it would be important as well for investment vehicles (pension, money 
market and mutual funds). Only five countries  out of the 19 that responded are considering 
adjusting regulation to take into account the systemic importance of the institution, although 
many more have not ruled out doing so. Supervision is more commonly adjusted to this fact, but 
mostly on a preliminary basis.  
6.  Cross-Sectional Regulation of Systemic Risk 
 
Regulation of systemic liquidity risk is still relatively incipient in LAC. About 60 percent of 
supervisors indicated that their current regulatory framework distinguishes between systemic and 
idiosyncratic  liquidity  risks
14. Some supervisors clarified that the distinction is done in the 
context of liquidity stress test scenarios or that the regulation envisions a role for the central bank 
in the provision of systemic liquidity. Most countries do not have systemic liquidity requirements 
in place, albeit their introduction has not been ruled out  (Figure 4). The existing requirements 
that are considered of systemic nature relate to cent ral bank reserve requirements, regulations 
that require banks to have contingency planning in the event of systemic liquidity shocks , and 
increased  liquidity requirements for foreign exchange liabili ties or for example prior to an  
election when systemic risks are perceived to be higher.  The incorporation of systemic liquidity 
concerns in capital is virtually non-existent. One of the respondents that indicated some form of 
requirement was in place referred to the capacity of the supervisor to require additional capital in 
reaction to risks that could affect the bank solvency (and thus its capacity to repay deposits).  
Capital charges in LAC are uniform across banks, and do not vary with the size of the institution, 
interconnectedness or other factor that determines its contribution to systemic risk. Uruguay and 
Peru indicated that they are considering imposing additional capital surcharges for systemic risk.  
                                                           
14 Only 20 percent of monetary authorities answered such distinction existed. 17 
 
Figure 4. Oversight of Cross Sectional Systemic Risk 
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In the case of Uruguay the surcharge under consideration will depend on the size of uninsured 
deposits and the size of international reserves available for the lender of last resort. In only about 
40 percent of countries do capital charges for counterparty credit risk vary depending on whether 
the counterparty is a regulated financial intermediary or unregulated.  
Financial  innovation  is  typically  regulated  in  the  region.  About  60  percent  of  supervisors 
including most LAC 5 countries) indicated that they have powers to authorize new financial 
products or regulate existing ones.  The majority of supervisors also indicated that they plan to 
introduce in the near future changes to the governance framework of financial intermediaries as a 
result of the global financial crisis (Figure 4). Some countries refer to the need to strengthen 
bank boards and improve fit and proper criteria for banks. Mexico noted that it has agreed to 
adopt the principles and standards issued by the Financial Stability Board regarding executive 
compensation.  The central bank of Brazil has drafted a document on executive compensation 
schemes which is under consultation. Several countries indicate the willingness to comply with 
any newly issued international standards for corporate governance.  
Deposit insurance schemes still need to be developed in several Latin American countries and 
price of insurance does not reflect contributions to systemic risks. As previously indicated, about 
40 percent of countries, mostly Caribbean and Central American do not have deposit insurance 
schemes  in  place.  Deposit  insurance  premium  typically  only  include  deposits  (exclusively 
insured  deposits  in  half  of  cases).  Countries  are  not  considering  charging  a  premium  over 
liabilities other than deposits or adjust the premium charged in relation to the systemic risk posed 
by the institution. 
 
7.  Dynamic Systemic Regulation 
 
Almost all monetary authorities indicated their interest rate policy is not sufficient to control 
credit cycles and asset bubbles, and several respondents indicated to have used other policy 
instruments as well. In some cases, given official dollarization, the central bank is not in control 
of interest rates. Some other countries indicated that excess liquidity in the financial system 
reduces the effectiveness of interest rate policy as banks do not need to borrow from the central 
bank. Other countries also pointed to the difficulties to detect asset bubbles. Four out of the nine 19 
 
respondents have used reserve requirements. They are perceived as quite successful instrument, 
particularly in the downturns. Two countries reported to use capital controls in the last 10 years 
to preserve financial stability. They were perceived at least moderately successful in diminishing 
exchange rate volatility and in shifting the maturity of foreign liabilities towards longer terms.  
 
There is wide variety of opinions among monetary authorities and supervisors on how strong is 
the case for having macroprudential tools to help control credit cycles and asset bubbles. About a 
third in each group of respondents sees a strong case, a moderate case and no case respectively 
(Figure 5). Some of the countries that saw a strong case for such tools indicated that being a 
small open economy external shocks have substantial impact and macroprudential tools would 
help stabilizing the economy. In general countries that did not see a case for such instruments 
pointed out to the fact they have not experienced asset bubbles. One supervisor noted that using 
macroprudential  instruments  in  the  downturn  could  be  potentially  dangerous  to  financial 
stability. 
 
Circuit breakers have not been widely used. Only 4 countries reported have been done so. In one 
case, stock trading was suspended. In other case, mutual fund redemptions were suspended when 
allowed by contractual clause. Other types of breakers where also introduced by the industry. For 
example, fund managers in one country temporarily changed the pricing of money market mutual 
fund quotas from historic to market price. About 50 percent of respondents indicate they are not 
considering introducing any type of circuit breakers. 
 
While LAC is ahead of other regions in the use of countercyclical provisions, the use of other 
countercyclical prudential regulations is incipient. Changes in capital requirements were only 
used in one case to control credit and asset bubbles in the last decade. Countercyclical liquidity 
norms are not used either, although more than half of respondents indicate they are not ruled 
out15  (Figure 5).  Equally, countercyclical capital and leverage ratio requirements are not in 
placed but about 70 percent of supervisors indicated they have not ruled them out. Four countries 
in the region have  introduced  countercyclical  provisioning  requirements (Bolivia, Colombia, 
                                                           
15 Some countries indicated they had some form of countercyclical liquidity requirement because they have countercyclical 
provisions. 20 
 
Peru  and  Uruguay)  and  two  other  countries  are  considering  their  introduction.  Virtually  no 
country  has  ruled  out  introducing  them  at  a  future  stage.  Regarding  countercyclical  lending 
norms, such as loan-to-value ratios or haircuts in repos, no country in the region has introduced 
them, albeit slightly over half of respondents indicated they have not ruled them out (including 
all LAC 5 supervisors).  
 
Financial authorities noted that the effectiveness of such measures needs to be further studied 
and  pointed  to  several  implementation  challenges.  In  most  cases  the  introduction  of  the 
countercyclical measures has been relatively recent.  Thus, supervisors and monetary authorities 
in these countries tend to think it is early to fully assess the success of existing countercyclical 
norms.    One  of  the  supervisors  also  noted  that  it  was  difficult  to  assess  the  impact  of  the 
countercyclical prudential norm in isolation from the rest of the regulatory framework.  
 
Respondents  indicated  that  technical  difficulties,  institutional  difficulties  and  implementation 
challenges are equally important factors that need to be addressed to introduce countercyclical 
norms.  One  country  mentioned  that  lack  of  statistical  records  complicated  the  calibration 
necessary for the design of the norm. Supervisors in two countries mention difficulties in getting 
the industry to accept the proposals given their lobbying capacity and in reaching agreement with 














Figure 5. Dynamic Systemic Regulation 
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8.  Systemic Risk Supervision and Challenges 
 
There is substantial scope for improvements in systemic risk supervision in LAC. About 45 
percent of respondents saw their ability to monitor systemic risk as good or excellent (including 
bank supervisors in 4 of the LAC 5 countries), and 40 percent indicated it needs strengthening 
(Figure 6). Two respondents indicated that effective consolidated supervision of conglomerates 
(including cross-border ones) would be necessary to improve systemic risk monitoring16. There 
are  several  key  hindrances  to  the  agencies’  capacity  to  conduct  effective  systemic  risk 
supervision including (i) the need to develop proper staff skills, (ii) better coordination with 
other domestic supervisors, (iii) need to strengthen legal powers, protection and independence of 
supervisors  and  (iv) better use of market data  (Figure 6).   Issues  related to  the supervisory 
architecture appear relevant as well; only about a third thought that rethinking the organization of 
supervision was moderately or not important factor. More than 50 percent of respondents saw 
assessment of risk profiles, strategic directions and internal controls as extremely important and 
virtually all thought this was extremely or very important for systemic risk monitoring. About 85 
percent of respondents thought that analysis and monitoring of compliance and trends observed 
from reported prudential reports was extremely or very important and 65 percent thought the 
same about reviewing the accuracy of reports of regulatory compliance. 
 
The majority of respondents thought that there should be a fundamental redefinition of the role 
and functions of the supervisor and making it more proactive, at least to some extent.  Only 
about  15  percent  of  respondents  did  not  think  any  reform  was  necessary  (Figure  6).  Some 
supervisors emphasized the need to decisively change the traditional scope of supervision to 
become  more  risk-based.  Several  of  them  also  indicated  that  supervisors  should  be  more 
proactive and adopt pre-emptive measures to preserve financial instability when perceived risks 
are building up. Supervisory agencies should then clarify their strategies and mechanisms to deal 
with such risks.  It was also noted that there may be excessive reliance on rating agencies and 
that  it  is  necessary  that  some  agency  be  willing  to  tackle  asset  price  bubbles.  Monetary 
authorities commented on the need to adopt a macroprudential approach both in regulation and  
                                                           
16 One country noted the need for international efforts to develop standards on systemic risk monitoring. Other country indicated 
the need for better models (in the profession in general) to understand the impact of financial instability on the economy. 23 
 
Figure 6. Systemic Risk Supervision Capacity 
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supervision.  About  half  of  respondents  indicated  that  recent  events  had  altered  their  views 
regarding the scope for market discipline and the role of price signals in helping enhance the 
effectiveness of official oversight.  
 
Frameworks to monitor sources of cross-sectional systemic risk still need to be developed in 
many countries. Less than a fourth of respondents felt that housing market monitoring was good 
and none thought it was excellent (Figure 6).  About 20 percent of respondents indicate they do 
not monitor housing market developments. Only one monetary authority thought its monitoring 
of this market was good. Supervisors noted that lack of good and reliable data on housing prices 
hampered monitoring albeit several supervisors indicated that housing credit markets remained 
underdeveloped, limiting  the scope for systemic risk build up. Over the counter derivatives 
markets are not monitored by half of the respondents whom indicated that such markets were not 
significant  in  their  jurisdictions.    Only  LAC  5  countries  reported  having  active  derivative 
markets and all supervisors in these countries thought that their monitoring was good and that the 
monetary authorities collected and reported data on transactions periodically to supervisors. Only 
a fourth of respondents indicated that their monitoring of regulatory arbitrage across groups or 
institutions with different licenses was good or excellent (Figure 6).  Off-balance sheet activities 
are monitored by all respondents and only 20 percent thought it needed strengthening. Regarding 
new and/or sophisticated products and services, only about a fifth of respondents thought that 
their ability to assess inherent risks was good (none thought it was excellent).  
 
Supervisory powers to request additional buffers to account for systemic risks appear limited in 
several jurisdictions. About 40 percent of respondents indicated that their powers for requesting 
that  an  institution  increases  its  capital,  provisions,  or  liquidity  based  on  their  exposure  to 
systemic risk was poor or non-existent (Figure 7). The main hindrance to the use of supervisory 
discretion is the agency’s legal mandate.  About 40 percent of respondents indicated that political 
pressures and industry pressures were an important factor and 30 percent pointed also to lack of 
legal protection. About 3/4 of respondents indicated that the civil code was not important factor. 
One supervisor also noted that the complexity of the issues involved in measuring systemic risk 
made it difficult to get precise measures on which to base additional prudential requirements. 
Most respondents indicated that market discipline should be strengthened at least to some extent, 25 
 
including through the adoption of the pillar 3 of Basel II and International Financial Reporting 
Standards.  
 
While  most  supervisors  and  monetary  authorities  in  LAC  have  operational  independence, 
budgetary and administrative independence to set salary scales is less frequent. The latter is the 
case especially among heads of supervisory agencies (about 40 percent indicated the lack such 
independence,  Figure  7).  Regarding  accountability,  most  agencies  indicate  they  are  legally 
responsible  to  the  government,  mostly  to  the  minister  of  finance,  or  the  monetary  board  or 
council in the countries in which such institution exists.  
 
The range of tools and indicators used to monitor systemic risk build up is still limited in most 
LAC countries. Only half of respondents monitor systemic risk based on macro developments 
and credit growth on a regular basis (Figure 7). Stress testing, financial stability reports and 
monitoring of evolution of credit and deposits over GDP are the tools used for this monitoring. 
About  40  percent  of  respondents  indicate  they  conduct  systemic  stress  testing  exercises 
regularly,  and  an  additional  30  percent  conduct  them  occasionally.  While  these  stress  tests 
account for the impact of macroeconomic factors, they seem to be mostly applied to commercial 
banks only.  Only 3 supervisors and 1 monetary authority reported to monitor systemic liquidity 
risks on continuous basis. An additional 40 percent of agencies indicated that they monitor it on 
a preliminary basis. Respondents indicated that they monitor liquidity ratios, interbank market 
rates and funding gaps but noted that they need to better incorporate interconnections. Several 
institutions  indicated  are  currently  working  on  incorporating  a  systemic  component  on  their 
liquidity monitoring. Few agencies assess marginal contribution of the individual institutions to 
systemic risk, mostly on a very preliminary basis, through stress tests exercises and monitoring 
interbank  linkages.  Only  about  20  percent  of  respondents  indicated  they  set  and  adjust 
discretionally  minimum  haircuts  on  securities  used  for  repos.  An  additional  20  percent  are 





Figure 7. Systemic Risk Supervision Challenges 
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9.  Inter-agency collaboration to monitor and manage systemic risk 
 
There is a variety of arrangements in LAC regarding who is responsible for setting prudential 
regulation. In about a third of countries the mandate for setting prudential regulation is with the 
central bank, while in another third with the superintendence (Figure 8). In Brazil, Guatemala, 
Eastern  Caribbean  countries  and  Dominican  Republic  the  responsibility  lies  in  a  monetary 
board/council, in Costa Rica is the responsibility of the council of supervisors while in Chile the 
responsibilities  are  split  between  the  central  bank  and  the  superintendence  with  the  former 
issuing prudential regulation related to financial and liquidity aspects and the latter concentrating 
on solvency related regulations.  In no LAC country prudential regulation falls under the purview 
of the minister of finance. 
 
The stability of the financial system is a collaborative effort between various regulatory bodies. 
In the majority of the countries, the central bank has a mandate to maintain financial stability (15 
out of 19 countries), together with the supervisor authority (9 countries) and/or the ministry of 
finance (Figure 8). In countries with monetary boards this institution is entrusted with this task. 
Most respondents indicated that the mandate is explicitly defined, although the term financial 
stability is not always explicitly mentioned but instead there are references to preserve the value 
of the currency and the stability of external and internal payments.  Over 70 percent of the 
respondent countries have financial stability departments in the central bank. 
 
There  appears  to  be  scope  for  increased  collaboration  between  supervisors  and  monetary 
authorities.  The majority of supervisors do not participate on monetary policy meetings, albeit 
most  of  supervisory  agencies  think  such  participation  would  be  desirable  since  the  banking 
sector plays a key role on monetary policy transmission and policy decisions can impact the 
liquidity and solvency of the system. One supervisory agency indicated that while permanent 
participation of the head of supervision in monetary is not necessary, he or she should be able to 
express opinions in financial instability contexts. In only about half of the respondent countries 
there are regular formal meetings between the head of monetary and supervisory agencies to 
discuss macro-prudential issues and outlook of the economy. In the rest of countries meetings are 
formal but occasional or they are regular but informal. However, regular formal meetings among 28 
 
technical staff are rarer. In one case the central bank clarified that they meet with technical staff 
from the superintendence when they are preparing the financial stability report to request data 
and opinions. About 75 percent of supervisors indicated that they did not collaborate at all on the 
production  of  the  central  bank  financial  stability  report.  In  no  case  collaboration  between 
superintendences and central banks (in countries where both exists) include joint participation on 
on-site or off-site inspections. In the countries in which supervision is within the central bank is 
not clear whether there is cooperation across departments; respondents indicated there is only 
one institution but details on the nature of the collaboration were not provided.  
 
Cooperation among different domestic supervisors could also be improved upon. Only half of the 
respondents indicated that that there are formal arrangements in place to discuss and resolve 
potential  issues  of  regulatory  arbitrage  across  financial  institutions  with  different  licenses 
supervised.  Some of these arrangements include:  (i) Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) 
with  local  and  foreign  supervisors  in  order  to  facilitate  information  sharing  and  to  convene 
formal  meetings  on  a  regular  basis;  and  (ii)  regulatory  committees  to  coordinate  financial 
groups’ supervision, review laws and regulations and to provide a forum for discussion of all 
relevant issues. About 40 percent of respondents indicated that they conduct inter-agency crisis 
simulation, but not on a regular basis.  
 
There are important challenges of cross border coordination in the LAC region. The main cross-
border sources of concern regarding systemic oversight are international financial groups and 
regional financial groups (70 percent of respondents see it as very or extremely important source) 
(Figure 8). Off shore entities also remained important for most countries. MOUs are considered 
extremely  important  for  providing  cross  border  information  exchange  by  50  percent  of 
supervisors  and virtually  all the rest  considered them very important.  Ad hoc contacts  were 
considered important or extremely important by 75 percent of the respondents, while only 55 
percent thought so of legally binding agreements. Letters of commitment seem to be the less 
effective mechanism. Lack of effective arrangements for cross-border information exchange and 
discussion  of  common  issues  is  a  very  important  concern  for  a  significant  majority  of  the 
respondents (75 percent). Over 50 percent of supervisors noted to be very or extremely important 
as well: (i) the lack of effective arrangements to deal with cross-border crisis (63 percent);  29 
 
Figure 8. Architecture and Coordination 
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(ii)  the  lack  of  effective  arrangements  to  discuss  common  issues  between  home  and  host 
supervisors (61 percent); (iii) the lack of effective cross-border inspections (57 percent); and (iv) 
the lack of effective arrangements for sharing the resolution costs of institutions operating cross-
border (50 percent). 
 
10. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Supervisors and monetary authorities in LAC, both in large and small countries, are increasingly 
focused on improving systemic oversight. The concern of the authorities with potential build up 
of systemic risks is warranted. While financial systems in LAC remain underdeveloped in terms 
of size and the complexity of products taken, a wide variety of financial intermediaries already 
operate  in  most  countries.  Large  cross-border  conglomerates  with  complex  structures  and 
institutions  that  because  of  their  size  or  interconnectedness  can  be  considered  systemically 
important  already  dominate  the  landscape  in  several  countries.  At  the  onset  of  the  global 
financial  crisis,  new  and  unexpected  channels  of  contagion  among  institutions  and  markets 
manifested.  In Mexico for example, a corporate default  arising from exposure to  exotic FX 
derivatives froze the commercial market paper in turn affecting firms refinancing capacity which 
could have prompted further corporate defaults. In Brazil, the central bank engaged in substantial 
liquidity injections, in part to counter the “drain” associated with the fact that banks had to place 
additional  liquidity  at  their  accounts  in  the  central  counterparty  clearing  house  to  cover 
heightened margin calls. The failure of CL financial, a large complex regional conglomerate with 
interests  in  insurance,  banking,  energy,  agriculture  and  real  estate  and  operations  in  several 
countries has had substantial impact in the Caribbean. Going forward, a key challenge for LAC 
(as elsewhere) would be reforming the current oversight and safety net structure to account for 
the accumulation of systemic risks. 
 
There  is  a  comprehensive  agenda  of  regulatory  reforms  being  considered  by  LAC  financial 
authorities  to  improve  systemic  risk  oversight.  Such  reforms  include  the  adoption  of 
macroprudential  regulations  (i.e.  adjusting  prudential  norms  to  account  for  cross-sectional 
systemic  risk  making  prudential  norms  more  counter-cyclical),  as  well  as  the  adoption  of 
regulation that limits the scope for regulatory arbitrage within conglomerates, including cross-31 
 
border ones. Regulatory perimeters are widely set in LAC and their redefinition is not a top 
priority at this time. Nevertheless supervisors perceive important opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage for institutions outside the perimeter and indicate that they plan to extend the perimeter 
to  hitherto  unregulated  institutions  (such  as  cooperatives).  Improving  the  safety  net,  the 
accounting framework and enhancing transparency are also considered important reform agenda 
items.  
 
In  tandem,  there  is  an  important  institutional  reform  agenda  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of 
systemic oversight. Enhancing supervisory capacity to assess systemic risks and to identify risks 
in  sophisticated  products  is  the  top  priority  for  supervisors  and  monetary  authorities  in  the 
region. Key aspects of the institutional reform also include redefining the role and functions of 
the supervisor to make it more proactive and enhancing supervisory powers to take discretionary 
action to reduce systemic risks. Finally, it is essential to improve cross-agency and cross-border 
coordination.  The  stability  of  the  financial  system  is  a  collaborative  effort  between  various 
regulatory bodies  which requires  enhanced coordination  between supervisors  and the central 
bank  as  well  as  among  different  line  supervisors.  Improved  crossed  border  coordination  is 
necessary  to  deal  with  risks  associated  to  the  operations  of  international  and  regional 
conglomerates are also pressing issuers.  
 
While the agenda is clearly defined, implementing reforms will require substantial efforts.  To 
keep up with fast-evolving markets and products it will be essential to boost supervisory capacity 
and resources. Mobilizing support for the necessary legal and institutional reforms and getting a 
clearer  vision  of  the  issues  and  alternatives  are  also  viewed  as  pressing  issues.  Multilateral 
institutions and supervisory associations could play a useful role to help in the implementation 
process enabling continuous capacity building, providing guidance on international best practices 
and helping mobilize support for implementation reform.  
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Dominican Republic  X 
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    Aruba  X  X 
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    Barbados  X 
  Belize 
    Cayman Islands  X 
  Haiti  X 
  Netherland Antilles 
    Suriname 
    Trinidad and Tobago  X 
  British Virgin Islands 
    Guyana 
    Jamaica 
    Eastern Caribbean Islands  X 
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Annex 2. Summary Statistics of Rating Questions* 
Question Average Median Variance n
a. A simpler financial system with limited global integration 3.48 4.00 1.64 27
b. A stricter approach to prudential oversight 3.56 4.00 0.64 27
c. A more limited exposure to subprime-type assets 4.30 4.00 0.68 27
d. A more limited exposure to toxic US assets 4.42 5.00 0.65 26
e. Other 3.60 4.00 2.30 5
a. Capital flows 2.96 3.00 1.00 26
b. Exchange rate fluctuations 2.62 2.50 1.21 26
c. Aggregate demand fluctuations 3.30 3.00 0.83 27
d. Other 3.71 4.00 0.57 7
a. The central bank 4.63 5.00 0.38 16
b. Other domestic supervisors 3.88 4.00 1.03 25
c. Foreign host supervisors 3.65 4.00 0.78 23
d. Foreign home supervisors 3.80 4.00 0.67 25
e. Multilateral organizations 3.52 4.00 1.01 25
a. Redefining the perimeter of prudential oversight 3.19 3.00 0.70 27
b. Adjusting prudential norms to better take into account 
cross-sectional systemic risk  3.67 4.00 1.08 27
c. Making prudential norms more counter-cyclical 3.41 4.00 1.40 27
d. Enhancing supervisory capacity to assess systemic risk 
and vulnerabilities 4.26 4.00 0.51 27
e. Enhancing supervisory powers to take discretionary action 
aimed at reducing systemic risk and vulnerabilities 3.74 4.00 1.20 27
f. Enhancing supervisory capacity to better identify and 
quantify the risks inherent in sophisticated products and 
services 4.07 4.00 0.38 27
g. Improving the safety net 3.52 4.00 1.18 27
h. Improving the accounting framework and enhancing 
transparency 3.56 4.00 0.64 27
i. Other 4.00 4.00 0.00 3
a. Getting a clearer vision of issues and alternatives 3.69 4.00 0.46 26
b. Mobilizing support for the necessary institutional and legal 
reforms 3.88 4.00 0.59 26
c. Boosting up supervisory capacity and human capital 4.08 4.00 0.55 26
d. Boosting up cross-agency coordination and cooperation 3.58 4.00 0.89 26
e. Other 4.00 4.00 1
Please rate the factors underlying the possible relative resilience of your financial system, compared 
to that of the countries in the world that were the most affected:   
Please rate the importance of the following macroeconomic factors in exacerbating the 
vulnerability of your financial system to the latest world cycle:
How would you rate the quality and usefulness of your cooperation with the following 
agencies regarding systemic oversight:
Please rate the priority of taking the following actions:
Please rate the importance of addressing the following possible stumbling blocks on the 
road to reform:34 
 
 
Question Average Median Variance n
a. Across financial institutions belonging to the same group 2.79 3.00 1.58 28
b. Across financial institutions with different licenses 2.46 2.00 1.07 28
c. Across financial intermediaries with different licenses 2.82 3.00 2.15 28
d. Across the balance sheets of regulated institutions (off 
balance vs. on balance) 2.48 2.00 1.87 27
e. Across borders 3.39 4.00 1.14 28
f. From the regulated to the unregulated 3.25 3.50 1.90 28
g. Other 1.00 1.00 0.00 2
a. Financial intermediation undertaken by unlicensed 
institutions 3.11 3.00 2.25 28
b. Other financial services provided by unlicensed institutions 2.75 2.50 1.82 28
c. Risk shifting between financial institutions and real sector 
corporations belonging to the same economic group 3.11 3.00 1.80 28
d.  Cross-border risk shifting across financial institutions 
belonging to the same group 3.71 4.00 0.73 28
e. Acquisition of large and opaque potential financial liabilities 
by real sector corporations 2.96 3.00 1.67 28
f. Over the counter trading of derivatives and other 
instruments 2.43 3.00 1.22 28
g. Other 1.00 1.00 0.00 2
a. Money market funds 2.52 2.00 1.26 27
b. Other mutual funds 2.32 2.00 1.26 28
c. Credit cooperatives 3.00 3.00 1.33 28
d. Leasing and factoring companies 2.22 2.00 1.10 27
e. Finance companies 2.62 2.00 1.29 26
f. Brokerage houses 2.29 2.00 1.25 28
g. Insurance companies 2.82 3.00 1.93 28
h. Pension funds 2.67 3.00 1.62 27
i. Hedge funds 1.95 2.00 1.10 20
j. Other 1.71 1.00 1.24 7
a. Technical difficulties (getting it right) 3.63 4.00 1.72 24
b. Institutional difficulties (getting everybody on the same page) 3.50 4.00 1.31 22
c. Implementation challenges 4.00 4.00 0.95 22
d. Other 3.67 3.00 1.33 3
Please rate the importance of the following additional potential perimeter issues:
Please  rate the importance of strengthening the regulation of the following financial institutions on 
account of potential systemic concerns:
If cyclically-adjusted prudential norms are deemed to be desirable but have not yet been introduced, 
rate the main difficulties that need to be overcome for their introduction and how much of a burden 
do the norms pose
Under your current regulatory and supervisory arrangements, please rate the importance of 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities in the following areas: 35 
 
 
Question Average Median Variance n
a. Developing proper staff skills 3.56 4.00 1.49 27
b. Paying proper salaries 2.86 3.00 1.68 28
c. Rethinking the organization of supervision 3.07 3.00 1.70 28
d. Strengthening the powers, legal protection, and 
independence of the supervisor 3.48 4.00 1.49 27
e. Better coordination with the central bank and/or other 
supervisory agencies 3.37 4.00 1.32 27
f. Better coordination with foreign supervisors 3.30 4.00 1.37 27
g. Better use of market data 3.26 3.00 0.89 27
h. Other 4.00 4.00 1
a. Analysis and monitoring of compliance and trends 
observed from reported prudential reports 4.25 4.00 0.49 28
b. Reviewing the accuracy of reports of regulatory 
compliance 3.79 4.00 1.14 28
c. Assessment of risk profiles, strategic directions, financial 
conditions and the adequacy of internal controls and risk 
management given the overall characteristics (size, 
complexity and risk profile) of the institution involved 4.46 5.00 0.41 28
a. The civil code 1.81 1.00 1.62 27
b. The agency’s legal mandate 2.89 3.00 1.95 27
c. Political pressures 2.11 2.00 1.10 27
d. Industry pressures 2.22 2.00 1.26 27
e. Lack of or weak legal protection of supervisory officials 2.37 2.00 1.86 27
f. Other 3.75 3.50 0.92 4
International financial groups 4.06 4.00 0.64 18
Regional financial groups 3.63 4.00 1.36 19
Off-shore entities 2.89 3.00 2.10 18
Other 3.00 3.00 4.00 3
Legally binding agreements 3.20 4.00 2.17 15
Memoranda of understanding 4.33 4.50 0.94 18
Letters of commitment 2.85 3.00 1.81 13
Ad hoc contacts 3.94 4.00 0.46 16
Others 5.00 5.00 1
Please rate the relative importance of the following potential cross-border sources of concern 
regarding systemic oversight:
Please rate the effectiveness of the following mechanisms, both formal and informal, for providing 
cross border exchanges of information:
Please rate the key hindrances to strengthening your agency’s capacity to conduct effective systemic 
supervision:
Please rate the relative importance placed on the following supervisory activities:
What in your view is the most important hindrance to the use of supervisory discretion?36 
 
 
*  Note:  The  rating  scale  used  was  extremely  important=5,  very  important=4,  important=3,  moderately 
important=2, not important =1. 
Question Average Median Variance n
a. Cross-border regulatory arbitrage  2.95 3.00 1.61 19
b. Agency and market discipline problems  2.58 3.00 0.81 19
c. Lack of effective arrangements for dealing with cross-
border crisis situations 3.58 4.00 0.92 19
d. Lack of effective arrangements for sharing the resolution 
costs of the local subsidiaries and/or branches of foreign 
institutions 3.11 3.50 1.52 18
e. Lack of effective arrangements to exchange information 
between home and host supervisors 3.79 4.00 1.62 19
f. Lack of effective arrangements to discuss common issues 
between home and host supervisors 3.58 4.00 1.48 19
g. Lack of effective arrangements for cross-border 
inspections 3.21 4.00 1.84 19
How concerned are you about the following potential cross-border issues?